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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff - Respondent, 
vs. 
RONALD R. KOURY, 
Defendant - Appellant. 
Case No. 900456-CA 
Category No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
As it relates to this Reply Brief of Defendant - Appellant, the 
jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is the same as that set forth 
in Defendant - Appellant's original brief. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did the District Court err in denying Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress, based upon the unlawful search and seizure violative of the 
protections provided by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article 
I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution? 
II. Did the District Court err in failing to find an agency 
relationship, where law enforcement officials had knowledge of and 
acquiesced to an informants entry into and search of a person's home? 
III. Did the District Court err in failing to extend the 
protections of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution, against unlawful searches and 
seizures, carried out vicariously by law enforcement officials? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Statement of the Case and Statement of the Facts applicable to 
this Reply Brief were sufficiently set out in the original brief of 
Appellant Ronald Koury. Appellant Koury would, however, point out that 
Appellee, the State of Utah, stated in its Statement of Facts that 
Horvath and Cordner never spoke again after an investigation was begun. 
The State cites to the record at 183-184. Horvath stated at lines 12 
and 13 at 184 that after the investigation began "Dennis would not speak 
to me as a friend or otherwise." However, the Record at 196-197 
demonstrates that Horvath changed his story on cross-examination. He 
there stated that he did in fact have daily contact with Cordner. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In its Brief, the State of Utah asserts that Defendant - Appellant 
Ronald Koury is raising an issue on appeal that was not raised in the 
trial court. The State has obviously misunderstood or misconstrued 
Kouryfs Brief. This appeal deals with the failure of the District Court 
to recognize an agency relationship between Horvath and local law 
enforcement officials. The issue of Horvath's agency was definitely 
raised at the level of the trial court. Numerous references and 
arguments to that end were made by Koury. If an agency relationship is 
found, then all subsequent evidence must be suppressed based upon the 
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. The suppression itself is not 
the entire basis of this appeal, the issue of agency is crucial to the 
issue of suppression and as such was raised in the trial court. 
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ARGUMENT 
This appeal deals with the necessity of suppression of evidence 
obtained by law enforcement officials as a result of certain illegal 
searches and seizures, carried out by an agent of law enforcement and 
law enforcement officials. 
I. THIS APPEAL DEAL8 WITH THE AGENCY 
STATUS OF THE INFORMANT HORVATH WHICH WAS 
IN FACT RAISED AT THE TRIAL LEVEL 
The State seeks to "cubby-hole" this appeal to the evidence seized 
by Horvath, when in fact the appeal deals with the overall agency status 
of Horvath. If the trial court erred as herein alleged by Koury, and 
Horvath is considered an agent, all evidence obtained from any and all 
searches conducted by Horvath as well as law enforcement as a result of 
Horvath's illegal and unauthorized involvement must be suppressed, not 
just the evidence gathered by Horvath. Thus, at this point, it is 
irrelevant whether the state seeks to introduce the evidence gathered 
by Horvath. The central theme of this appeal is to determine the agency 
status of Horvath. If Horvath is found to be an agent, then and only 
then does the issue of suppression of evidence come before the court. 
There is ample support on the record for Koury's assertions that 
Horvathfs agency status was in fact challenged in the trial court. A 
review of Koury's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress (R. at 90 
through 96) will reveal that this agency status and search and seizure 
related thereto was in fact raised in the Motion to Suppress. In 
further support of Kouryfs claim that Horvathfs agency and illegal 
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search and seizure was in fact raised at the trial level is the 
following language used by Koury in his Memorandum in Support: 
Horvath, as an agent of the police, was prohibited 
from entering Defendant Kouryfs house without a 
warrant. Horvath entered Defendant's house several 
times after contacting the police with information 
regarding drug trafficking and distribution, and 
evidence obtained through Horvath after April 4, 
1989 should be suppressed. (R. at 94 and 95 
emphasis added). 
The foregoing demonstrates that Koury attempted to show that Horvath was 
an agent. It demonstrates that Koury attempted to suppress all even 
obtained as a result of Horvathfs mere involvement, based upon his 
illegal searches and seizures as an agent of law enforcement. 
II. HORVATH*8 8TATD8 AS AN AGENT OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT TAINTS ALL EVIDENCE RECOVERED 
AS A RESULT OF HIS ILLEGAL SEARCHES AND 
SEIZURES PURSUANT TO THE FRUIT OF THE 
POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE 
An endless number of cases have dealt with the fruit of the 
poisonous tree cases. By way of illustration, United States v. Vauahan, 
718 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. Cal. 1983), held that if a warrant is invalid 
because the affidavit in support of the warrant relied significantly on 
illegally seized evidence (or on illegal searches in the instant case), 
it follows that any evidence seized pursuant to it must also be 
suppressed. This case demonstrates the doctrine of the fruit of the 
poisonous tree. As it relates to the instant case, Horvath1s illegal 
and unauthorized searches and seizures taint not only the substances he 
removed from the Koury home, but all evidence obtained, including that 
sought to be introduced by the State, as a result of information from 
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Horvath's illegal searches and seizures. 
Additionally, Lucas v. State, 704 P.2d 1141 (Okla. 1985), held that 
a gun and certain drug paraphernalia, seized from the defendant's 
residence, even though obtained pursuant to a valid search warrant, was 
discovered by the exploitation of an illegal search and was fruit of the 
poisonous tree and as such it must be suppressed. This is the same 
basic doctrine with a slight factual change. The point is that not only 
is the evidence which Horvath personally seized subject to suppression, 
but so is the evidence seized by law enforcement as a result of 
Horvath's illegal involvement. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the State's argument that the issue on appeal is not 
properly before the Court is erroneously based and should be so 
recognized. The issue on appeal of Horvath's agency status and the 
subsequent issue of the suppression of evidence related to Horvath's 
actions were in fact properly raised at the trial court level. Horvath 
was an agent of law enforcement as evidenced by his continued entrance 
into the home of an alleged would-be assailant and his "daily" contact 
with law enforcement in that regard. 
Respectfully submitted this day of April, 1991. 
WAYNE B. WATSON, P.C. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Reply Brief for Appellant, with postage prepaid thereon, were mailed to 
the office of R. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney General and Charlene 
Barlow, Assistant Attorney General, Attorneys for Appellee, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this ? ' day of April, 1991. 
WAYtfE B. WATSON, P.C. 
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ADDENDUM 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV. 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
UTAH CONST, art. I, §14. 
[Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall 
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
WAYNE B. WATSON, P.C. -» 3405 
DANA D. BURROWS - 5045 
WATSON, SCRIBNER & BURROWS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2 69 6 N. University Avenue 
Suite '220 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-5600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD R. KOURY, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Civil No. 891400352 
(Judge Christensen) 
COMES NOW Defendant, by and through counsel of record, and pursuant 
to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration hereby submits 
the Point and Authorities in Support of the Motion to Suppress as 
follows: 
MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On or about April 4, 1989, informant Joseph Horvath spoke with 
officers Dennis Kordner and Gary L. Caldwell regarding threats he had 
been receiving from Defendant, Ron Koury. At this time, he also 
mentioned the Defendant's name in connection with distributing illegal 
narcotics. 
2. In Officer Caldwell's Probable Cause Affidavit, he states that 
Officer Kordner and Horvath were in daily contact since April 4, 1989, 
concerning this case. 
on Koury's telephone ntunber as a result of the information given to him 
by Horvath to keep track of all phone calls made to or from the house, 
in order to keep track of Koury's whereabouts. 
4. On May 1, 1989, Horvath went to Koury's house to check the 
windows and feed the animals. In one bedroom, he observed what he 
thought to be residue from a line of cocaine, and in another room in the 
house, he observed what he thought to be cocaine paraphernalia. Horvath 
went to the police with this information. 
5. Horvath entered Koury's house at least two more times between 
May 1 and May 8, 1989. The warrant to search Koury's residence was 
issued on May 8, 1989. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Mr. Horvath was acting as an agent of the police. 
Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, defines "agent" as follows: 
One who represents and acts for another under the contract or 
relation or agency. One who undertakes to transact some 
business, or to manage some affair, for another, by the 
authority and on account of the latter, and to render an 
account of it. 
Mr. Horvath told the police, specifically Officer Caldwell and 
Officer Kordner, on April 4, 1989, that the Defendant was trafficking 
and distributing cocaine. Mr. Horvath had accurately informed police 
in the past and was considered, by Caldwell, to be a reliable informant. 
The police were in constant contact with Mr. Horvath concerning the 
whereabouts and activities of the Defendant from April 4, 1989, until 
the date the search warrant was issued. Mr. Horvath was acting under 
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the authority of the police in keeping track of Defendant and looking 
through the rooms in Defendant's house. If this were not the situation, 
why then would the police and Mr. Horvath be in daily contact? Police 
knew that Defendant had asked Horvat.h to keep an eye on his house while 
he was out of town, and took advantage of this to get Horvath to search 
through the house for evidence of the alleged trafficking and 
distribution. 
On May 1, 1989, while Mr. Horvath was supposedly looking through 
Defendant's house to check the windows, Horvath observed cocaine residue 
and paraphernalia and told the police what he had seen. Horvath also 
entered the house at least two more times after May 1, 1989, to "check 
the windows and feed Defendant's pets." The police knew that Horvath 
had access to Defendant's house and, therefore, used Horvath, as an 
agent, to do an illegal search in order to obtain probable cause for a 
legal search warrant. 
II. An informants information must be considered reliable and 
apprised of the underlying facts and circumstances which show 
probable cause. 
The Court in Aauilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), established a 
two-pronged standard in obtaining a search warrant: 
1. The standard of reasonableness for obtaining a search warrant 
is the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
2. Although an affidavit supporting a search warrant may be based 
on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct 
personal observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be 
informed of some of the underlying circumstances relied on by 
the person providing the information and some of the 
underlying circumstances from which the affiant concluded that 
the informant, whose identity was not disclosed, was 
creditable or his information reliable. 
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Horvath first informed the police of the alleged wrongdoings of the 
Defendant on April 4, 1989, In a Preliminary Hearing, held on September 
13, 1989, Horvath told the Court that he and Koury were close friends 
and were partners in a body shop business from June, 1987, to December, 
19 88, Horvath stated that he and the Defendant had several arguments. 
Horvath also stated that Defendant Koury "threatened mine and my wife 
and kids1 life, I was concerned that he was going to inflict bodily harm 
on myself and my family . . . this guy is a mental case." United States 
v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971), states: 
Recent case law has acknowledged that a different rationale 
exists for establishing the reliability of named citizen 
informers as opposed to unnamed police informer, who are 
frequently criminals. Those in the latter category often 
proffer information in exchange for some concession, payment, 
or simply out of revenge against the subject; under such 
circumstances, it is proper to demand some evidence of their 
credibility or reliability. 
Horvath had some personal interest in Defendant's arrest, as he had been 
allegedly threatened many times and was worried for his and his family's 
lives. In their affidavit, the police testified that Horvath was a 
reliable informant. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 574 (1971) states 
that: 
reliability of the informant was not necessary, since the 
inquiry as to probable cause was whether the informer's 
present information was truthful or reliable. 
In light of Horvath's relationship to Defendant, thoughts of his own 
safety and gain may have influenced his information to be unreliable and 
given him motive to enter Koury's house to aid the police in their 
investigation. Horvath's motive being to help the police catch Koury 
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before Koury carried oat any of his threats. 
In addition, the fact that Horvath was an unnamed police informant, 
with possible ulterior motives, his information should be held to the 
higher level of scrutiny of United States v. Harris. 
III. An acting agent of the police is the equivalent of an employee 
of the police, which -rculd require the agent to obtain a 
search warrant before entering a suspect's house. 
In Pavton v. N.Y. , 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Court held that the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from entering a suspect's home 
without a warrant to make a rourine arrest. The Court reasoned that 
these searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable, when the purpose is to search or seize an 
object or a person. Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United 
States states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
This right is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1986) 
states that: 
The Fourth Amendment does not protect against all searches and 
seizures, but rather against those which are unreasonable... 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment, however, apply only 
to governmental action; a search or seizure, even if 
unreasonable, performed by a private person not acting as a 
government agent or in concert with a government official is 
not within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 
Horvath, as an agent of the police, was prohibited from entering 
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Defendant Koury's house without a warrant. Horvath entered Defendant's 
house several times after contacting the police with information 
regarding drug trafficking and distribution, and evidence obtained 
through Horvath after April 4, 1989 should be suppressed. Horvath 
continued entering the home and making observations on behalf of the 
police, thus demonstrating an agency relationship. Based upon the 
knowledge the police had of the relationship between Hoirvath and the 
Defendant, they took advantage of the situation by having Horvath 
conduct searches they could not legally conduct themselves- Such a 
relationship must be considered one of agency due to the severe results 
upon Fourth Amendment protections were the Court to rule otherwise. 
Horvath claims to be in fear for his own life and the lives of his 
wife and children, but asks the Court to believe that he continued to 
enter the house and feed the animals of his friend. It seems somewhat 
illogical to continue with such activities, when one is in fear for 
one's life. As an agent, Mr. Horvath would be able to implicate 
defendant in an action such as the present if he were to continue to 
provide information and surveillance to the police, which is exactly 
what he did. 
When the totality of the circumstances are analyzed, it is obvious 
that Horvath was an informant, he was acting at police suggestion, 
motivation, request, or the like. He informed police and continued to 
do so up to the time of arrest. It is a smear upon Fourth Amendment 
protections to allow the police to carry on an investigation through an 
informal agency relationship, obtaining evidence and subsequent warrant 
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and arrest, illegally. 
CONCLUSION 
The police are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment from searching 
a personfs home without a warrant- Horvath, as an agent of the police, 
is considered an extension of that body, and is bound by the same laws 
and limitations as the police. Horvath searched Defendant's house 
without a search warrant, under the supervision of the police, in 
violation of the Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the 
evidence found during any such searches, should be suppressed, as it was 
obtained in violation of Defendant's rights. To allow the police to act 
in such a manner as it violates the state and federal constitutions, 
would be a grave injustice. 
DATED this ^^ day of June, 1990. 
WAYNSfV. WATSON, P.C. 
At-t£opney for Defendant 
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing, to the following on the "XX- day of June, 1990: 
Sherry Ragan 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
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A Okay. So Officer Cordner was asking you some ques-
tions about him? 
A No, no. 
Q Okay. Did you later give him more information with 
regard to Mr. Koury? 
A Yes. 
Q When did that occur? 
A I donft know the exact date. 
Q Okay, would you say your conversations escalated 
then, you talked to him more and more about Mr. Koury? i 
A Yes. ! 
i 
Q Okay. And what type of information were you giving 
him then? 
A Well, Mr. Koury had stated to me that he would 
implicate me in any and all matters regarding drugs or any 
other illegal activity that he would be engaged in, that I 
was acting as his partner. And so I became worried. 
Q When, do you recall when that occurred? 
A On a number of occasions. 
Q And did you tell Officer Cordner about that? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you remember when? 
A I don't. I mean it's, you know, it's a repeated 
thing. 
Q Okay. What else did you tell Officer Cordner? 
13 /$? 
A What else did I tell him? 
Q Urn-hum (yes), about Mr. Koury. 
A Specifically? Help me, I donft know what you are, 
what? 
Q How often did you talk to Officer Cordner about Mr. 
Koury just prior to the May 8th date when he was arrested? 
A How often did I? Not hardly at all. 
Q Okay, do you recall what kind of things you were 
telling him? 
A Once they started an investigation, I did not speak 
to him at all. At that time I had to speak with Gary 
Caldwell. Dennis would not talk to me as a friend or other-
wise . 
Q Okay. And when did that happen? 
A I don't know the exact day. 
Q All right. And what kind of things did you tell 
Officer Caldwell? 
A Oh, just, just different things, periods of time 
that Ron had been gone, and call up ranting and raving, and 
not taking his kids to school, and stuff like that. 
Q Okay. Why were you giving him that information? 
A Why? Because I had fear for my life. 
Q Did you know that they were doing an investigation? 
A Yes, ma'am, I did. 
Q Okay. And what was your understanding of what was 
u /r/ 
A I don't recall. 
Q Give me your best estimate. 
A Oh, maybe eight or ten times. I have no idea. 
Q And how many times do you think that you talked 
to Officer Cordner between 4 April and 8 May? 
A I have no idea. 
Q Give me your best estimate. 
A Well, between 4th April and May, I did Detective 
Cordner's police car, which was involved in an accident, and 
his car was in my shop. So Detective Cordner would come by 
to check on the vehicle. So I would, during that period of 
time, I would have had cause to talk to him almost daily 
while I was working on his police vehicle. 
Q And you talked about Koury, right? That wouldn't 
be the purpose of your conversation, but almost daily for 
that 34-day period you talked about Koury? 
A No. It was kind of a joke, and he's still gone, 
I mean, it was not, he is present in the shop had become so 
un-often that it was a joke, when we seen him there working 
it was a special day. 
Q Well, C^  _ner was anxious to know when he came 
back. Right? 
A Not really. I didnft have any idea when Koury was 
coming back. 
Q Now do you recall testifying on direct examination 
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some ten minutes ago that you never talked to Cordner from 
4 April until 8 May, cause Detective --
A Not in regards to Koury. 
Q Let me finish my question. 
A Okay. 
Q Do you recall testifying a moment ago on direct 
examination that between 4 April, when you first told them 
about the cocaine and took some to the police, and 8 May, 
that you never talked to Detective Cordner after that? 
A Yes. 
Q It was all conversation with -- Caldwell? 
A Well, except for doing his car, you know. I mean, 
now that we have been sitting here recalling this period of 
time, it comes to light in my mind that during that period 
of time I fixed Detective Cordner's car. 
Q Okay, so would you like to change your testimony 
with regard to the conversations that you had before? 
A Yes. I would say that I would change my testimony, 
because while I was fixing Dennis1 car I did have occasion 
to talk to him regularly; however, not about the Koury case, 
it was about his car. 
Q Now, the bird, wasn't there, the parrot; Ron has a 
parrot, doesn't he? 
A Urn-hum. (yes) 
Q The parrot wasn't there on the 8th of May, was it? 
27 (f?-
